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ABSTRACT 
 
Household Decision Making and the Influence of Spouses’ 
Income, Education, and Communist Party Membership: 
A Field Experiment in Rural China
*
 
We study household decision making in a high-stakes experiment with a random sample of 
households in rural China. Spouses have to choose between risky lotteries, first separately 
and then jointly. We find that spouses’ individual risk preferences are more similar the richer 
the household and the higher the wife’s relative income contribution. A couple’s joint decision 
is typically determined by the husband, but women who contribute relatively more to the 
household income, women in high-income households, women with more education than 
their husbands, and women with communist party membership have a stronger influence on 
the joint decision. 
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1  Introduction 
Many important economic decisions – e.g., labor supply, residential location, buying 
insurance or a new car, and investing in stocks and bonds or in children’s education – are 
often made by households rather than by individuals. While the traditional, neoclassical 
model of household behavior – known as the unitary model – has assumed that households 
behave as if they were a single entity with a common utility function and income pooling (see 
Vermeulen, 2002, for a survey), the approach of collective models of household decision 
making (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981) has allowed for different 
preferences of household members. Collective (non-unitary) models assume that household 
behavior is determined in a bargaining process that leads to an efficient use of the available 
resources (see, e.g., Bourguignon et al., 1994; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, 1996; Browning 
and Chiappori, 1998). Field evidence generally favors the non-unitary models. In particular, it 
has been shown that decisions and outcomes in a household – such as child health, nutrition, 
and expenditures for different goods and services (e.g., tobacco and child care) – depend 
strongly on whether its income is controlled by the husband or the wife (see, e.g., Thomas, 
1994; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Duflo, 2003). Qian 
(2008), for instance, reports that the relative female income (as a share of total household 
income) in Chinese households has had a significantly positive impact on the survival rates 
for girls and on the educational attainment of children.  
Typically, field studies exploit the occurrence of exogenous shocks to the income of 
different household members to investigate the effects of such shocks on key household 
variables, such as how income is spent or how the household income distribution affects 
children. Recently, field studies have been complemented by laboratory experiments as a 
method for gaining deeper insights into household behavior by carefully controlling – and 
varying – the conditions under which household members can make decisions. While most of 
the experimental papers tested existing models of household behavior (see, e.g., Peters et al.,   2
2004; Bateman and Munro, 2005; Iversen et al., 2006; de Palma, Picard and Ziegelmeyer, 
2008; Munro, Bateman and McNally, 2008), Ashraf (forthcoming) used an experiment to 
uncover features that might be missing in existing models. Running an experiment in the 
Philippines, she showed that the financial decisions of spouses are influenced by whether the 
(experimental) income is known to the other spouse and whether spouses communicate about 
how to spend the experimental earnings before making a decision on how to use them. In 
particular, she found that spouses are much more likely to hide money from their partner by 
putting it into a private account (even if this is inefficient) if the income is private information 
and the partner controls household savings. When spouses communicate about how to spend 
the income of each spouse, the spouse not in charge of household savings (typically the 
husband) has typically transferred his income to the account of the spouse who controls 
household savings (typically the wife). 
The present paper examines household decision making under risk in an artefactual field 
experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) in rural China. Similarly to Ashraf (forthcoming), our 
primary aim is not to test the predictive success of a particular model of household decision 
making, but rather to provide empirical evidence on two important aspects of household 
decision making, each of which is key to either the unitary or the collective model of the 
household. First, we address how similar the two spouses’ individual decisions are when 
decisions are made separately, and which socioeconomic factors influence the level of 
similarity. This is another way of asking under which conditions the assumption of identical 
preferences of household members – key to the unitary model – might be more or less 
fulfilled. Second, we study how a couple’s joint decision relates to the spouses’ separate 
decisions, and which conditions promote a stronger influence of the wife on the joint decision. 
Thus, we can study the circumstances that determine the outcome of an implicit bargaining 
process that is assumed to take place in the household. Our experiment will allow us to 
observe both spouses’ individual preferences and their joint decision when a situation calls for   3
one. Such a ceteris paribus comparison of individual and joint decisions is hardly possible 
with non-experimental field data. 
Compared to earlier experiments on household decision making, one novel feature of our 
experiment is that the participating households were randomly sampled. The experiment was 
run in seven randomly selected villages in the Majiang region in the Guizhou province, which 
is a relatively poor province in southwest China. In each village, the local village council 
drew between 10 and 24 households randomly from the official household registration list. 
The selected households were then approached by the experimenters to take part in the 
experiment. In total, 117 married couples ended up participating. Another important feature of 
our experiment is the fact that it is a high-stakes experiment. The mean earnings per 
participant were equivalent to the average income from three days of work. 
Bateman and Munro (2005) and de Palma et al. (2008) are most closely related to our 
paper. Bateman and Munro (2005) examined whether decisions made by couples conform 
more or less to the axioms of expected utility theory compared to decisions made by spouses 
individually. To do this, they invited 76 couples and let the spouses make risky decisions both 
separately and jointly. Their results suggest that couples exhibit the same kinds of departures 
from expected utility theory as individuals. Furthermore, they found joint decisions to be 
typically more risk averse than the spouses’ individual decisions. de Palma et al. (2008) 
focused on the question of which spouse has more influence on joint decisions. Based on 
observations from 22 couples, they concluded that husbands generally have a stronger 
influence on joint decisions than wives, although wives gain influence if they control the 
computer keyboard while entering the joint decisions in the experiment. In addition, de Palma 
et al. (2008) reported, contrary to Bateman and Munro (2005), that the joint decision of a 
couple tends to be less risk averse than the spouses’ individual decisions. 
Our paper distinguishes itself from Bateman and Munro (2005) and de Palma et al. (2008) 
in several dimensions: First, the subject pools are completely different. Whereas Bateman and   4
Munro (2005) and de Palma et al. (2008) ran their experiments in highly developed countries, 
ours was conducted in the field in a rather poor area of China, which by many accounts is still 
a developing country. On average, our subjects had 4.8 years of schooling and a yearly 
income of 570 USD. Second, and most importantly, our sample is random. This means that 
the subjects were not invited through flyers or newspaper ads to participate in an experiment; 
instead they were randomly selected by the village council and then approached by the 
experimenters in their homes. Although participation was voluntary, no couple refused to 
participate given they were present at home. Third, our experiment involves much higher 
stakes than those used in the UK by Bateman and Munro (2005) or in Germany by de Palma 
et al. (2008). In our experiment, the average earnings from participating in the experiment 
were equivalent to the average income earned from three days of off-farm work.
1 Fourth, the 
research focus is different. Unlike Bateman and Munro (2005), we are not interested in 
whether couple decisions exhibit more or less so-called anomalies in decision making than 
decisions made individually; instead we examine the socio-demographic conditions under 
which (i) a couple’s separate decisions are more similar and (ii) a couple’s joint decision is 
more likely to be driven by the wife’s individual preferences. Although de Palma et al. (2008) 
did address item (ii), they only took account of who was holding the computer mouse when 
entering the joint decision, while we consider a set of socio-demographic variables to estimate 
how individual decisions of spouses relate to the couple’s joint decision. 
We find that spouses in richer households have more similar individual risk attitudes. In 
contrast, length of marriage, for instance, has no impact on similarity. The latter result seems 
at odds with the layman’s view that couples either become more similar in their behavior the 
longer they have been together or stay together for a long time only if they have similar 
preferences to begin with. A couple’s joint decision is, in general, closer to the husband’s 
                                                 
1 Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) also ran a high-stakes experiment on risky decision making in China. They 
focused on the question of how the level of incentives affects revealed risk preferences. The experiment involved 
students from Peking University, and is thus unrelated to household decision making.   5
individual decision. However, we show that women who contribute relatively more to 
household income, women with more education than their husbands, and women with 
communist party membership have a significantly stronger influence on joint decisions. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides background information on our 
subject pool and on the Chinese province where the experiment was conducted. Section 3 
introduces the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 presents the experimental results, 
and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  Location of the experiment and background information on the sample 
The experiment was conducted in rural communities in the Guizhou province, which is the 
16
th largest out of 32 provinces in China and is located in the southwest part of the country. 
Guizhou’s total population is 39 million, and its main industries are mining, timber, and 
forestry. The gross domestic product per capita was around 6,700 Chinese Yuan in 2007.
2 
This figure – the lowest among all provinces – corresponds to approximately 34% of the 
national average (20,000 Chinese Yuan in 2007; see NBS, 2008). 
The University of GOTHENBURG (with which all authors are affiliated) supports a 
research program at Peking University. The Guizhou province is one of the regions where this 
program conducts research, which is the reason for choosing this province for our experiment. 
The sampled region is Majiang, located in the eastern part of Guizhou and around 100 
kilometers away from the province’s capital city. The local forestry bureau officials provided 
us with a list of villages and townships, from which they randomly selected five townships 
and then a total of seven villages from these five townships. In each village, the local village 
council randomly selected from the household registration list – which includes all officially 
married couples – between 10 and 24 households, depending on the size of the village. In 
                                                 
2 1 US Dollar corresponded to 7.42 Chinese Yuan at the time of running the experiment (November 2007).   6
order to prevent villagers from spreading the word about the experiment within a village, we 
employed 20 interviewers
3 so that all experiments in a village could be finished within at most 
five hours. The whole selection process was supervised by the principal field researcher. 
Then, one member of the village cadre (i.e., a local official) accompanied two interviewers to 
the selected households. These households were then approached by the interviewers. In total, 
117 households were interviewed, and all of them participated voluntarily in the experiment. 
If one of the spouses was not at home at the time of the interviewers’ visit, the household next 
door was approached.
4 Upon entering the homes, the couples were first surveyed on several 
issues concerning farming and forestry (as part of the Environment for Development project at 
the University of GOTHENBURG), and were then invited to participate in a risk experiment.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 reports background statistics of the sampled households. The average yearly 
income per capita is 3,919 Chinese Yuan, which is about 40% lower than the Guizhou 
province yearly average, but very close to the Majiang region average. Forty-two percent of 
the household income is generated from off-farm sources, and 36% from agriculture. The 
remaining income originates from forestry, remittances, and other sources. Women contribute 
on average 42% of the total household income. Among the couples in our sample, only one 
had been married for less than one year. The maximum length of marriage was 52 years, and 
the average was 27 years. It is important to note that many families in this region are not 
affected by the official one-child policy, and therefore the average number of children is 
larger than one. The reason for this is that the one-child policy is mainly for Han Chinese, and 
in our sampled region more than one-third of the inhabitants belong to other ethnic groups. 
The level of education is very low in our sample; the average number of years of schooling is 
                                                 
3 To avoid any interviewer effects, we randomly reshuffled the pairs of interviewers each day in the field. 
4 This happened in around 20 cases.   7
6.09 for husbands and 3.62 for wives. The overall average in the Guizhou province is 6.75 
years of schooling, which indicates that the Majiang region is relatively underdeveloped. 
 
 
3  Experimental design and procedure 
3.1  The experimental task 
We used the choice list introduced by Holt and Laury (2002) to let subjects make risky 
decisions. Table 2 shows the ten pairwise choices. In each choice task, subjects had to choose 
either Option A (which can be regarded the relatively safe option) or Option B (the relatively 
risky option). While the possible payoffs in both options were fixed in all ten choices, the 
probability for the high payoff in each option increased in steps of 10 percentage points from 
10% to 100%. Consequently, the probability for the low payoff decreased by 10 percentage 
points from 90% to 0%. For instance, in the first decision the respondents had to choose 
between an Option A of earning either 20 Chinese Yuan with a probability of 10% or 16 
Chinese Yuan with a probability of 90%, and an Option B of earning either 38.5 Chinese 
Yuan with a 10% probability or 1 Chinese Yuan with a 90% probability. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The far-right column of Table 2 indicates the difference in expected payoffs. In the first 
four (final six) rows, Option A (Option B) has a higher expected payoff. Therefore, a risk 
neutral subject would choose Option A in the first four decisions and Option B in the last six 
decisions. Subjects who switch to Option B after the fifth choice can be classified as risk 
averse, whereas subjects switching to Option B prior to the fifth choice are considered risk 
loving. 
   8
3.2  Procedure 
Two interviewers (henceforth called experimenters) visited each randomly selected 
household. The experimenters arrived at the household together with one member of the 
village cadre, who introduced the experimenters to the spouses. The cadre member then 
kindly asked the spouses if they would like to participate in a survey and an experiment which 
was going to be conducted by the two experimenters. If the spouses were willing to 
participate, the cadre member left before the experiment began. It turned out that all of the 
selected couples that were home were willing to participate in the experiment. 
In total, there were four stages in the experiment. Each stage was explained only after the 
previous stage had been finished. Before Stage 1, spouses were separated into two different 
rooms, each of them accompanied by an experimenter.
5  This was done to avoid that the 
answers of one spouse would be influenced by the presence of the other spouse. In Stage 1, 
each spouse had to answer a detailed questionnaire on socio-demographic characteristics, 
health status, and social capital individually. In Stage 2, each spouse made individual 
decisions in the choice task of Holt and Laury (2002). In Stage 3, the two spouses were 
reunited and had to give joint answers regarding the financial situation of the household and 
some additional household characteristics. In this stage and the following, the spouses could 
talk to each other. Stage 4 was identical to Stage 2, except that the spouses had to make a joint 
decision, which means that they had to agree on which option to choose in the ten choice 
tasks. In the introduction to Stage 4, the participants were informed that the amounts in each 
option would be paid to each of the spouses. This procedure was chosen to keep each spouse’s 
incentives constant across Stage 2 and Stage 4. The experimenters were present in the same 
room to be able to answer any questions immediately, and they recorded a joint decision as 
fixed only after both spouses had given their consent. Both in Stage 2 and Stage 4, 
                                                 
5 In order to avoid any kind of experimenter effects, we balanced the genders of the two experimenters in each 
household visit. Furthermore, we instructed the experimenters to switch back and forth between interviewing the 
wife and interviewing the husband when moving from one household to the next.   9
participants were instructed that one of the ten decisions in each stage would be played out for 
real at the end of the experiment, and in Stage 2 it was stressed that the payment for Stage 2 
would be done separately for husbands and wives in different rooms. 
Given the generally low educational level of our participants, we took great care to 
explain the rules of the experiment as clearly as possible. To do so, the task at hand was first 
explained orally and then demonstrated visually both in Stage 2 and Stage 4. The probabilities 
for the high and low payoff in a given option were illustrated by using white and black chips 
on two separate boards that illustrated an Option A and an Option B. On the left-hand side of 
each board, we wrote down the high amount and on the right-hand side the low amount. For 
example, for the first decision (see Table 2), we placed one white chip next to the high 
amount and nine black chips next to the low amount. Then we put all chips in a bag and told 
the participants that at the end of the experiment they would be able to draw one chip from 
such a bag, and that drawing a white (black) chip would yield the high (low) payoff in the 
chosen option. 
At the end of the experiment, the spouses were sent to two separate rooms again. There 
each spouse had to draw one card from a deck of ten numbered cards to determine which 
Stage 2 decision would be played for real. Then, as described above, he/she got to draw a chip 
from a bag with the corresponding distribution of white and black chips. Since this procedure 
was executed in two separate rooms, each spouse could receive his/her income privately, 
which means that spouses could hide their earnings from their partner if they wished to 
(earnings from Stage 2 were not disclosed to the other spouse by the experimenters). To 
determine Stage 4 payoffs, the couple was brought together again. Then, one spouse had to 
draw one card from the deck, and the other picked one chip from a bag that contained a 
corresponding distribution of chips. 
In total, executing the four stages took about 1.5 hours. On average, participants earned 37 
Yuan, which equals 0.9% of an average yearly income, or three days of off-farm work.   10
4  Results 
4.1  Analysis of aggregate data 
Table 3 shows the relative frequency with which husbands, wives, and couples chose the 
safer Option A over the more risky Option B. We report only consistent choices, meaning that 
we exclude all observations where a decision maker switched back at least once to Option A 
after having chosen Option B earlier, or where Option A was chosen in the tenth decision (i.e., 
preferring 20 Chinese Yuan for sure over 38.5 Chinese Yuan for sure). In total, 105 (out of 
117) husbands, 108 wives, and 105 couples made consistent decisions. Hence, 318 out of 351 
choice sets (90.5%) are fully consistent. Given the low educational level of our sample 
(compared to university students), we consider this large fraction of consistent choices a 
success of the experimental procedure.
6 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The bottom row of Table 3 indicates the average number of safe choices. Recall that a 
risk-neutral decision maker would choose the relatively safer Option A four times, and then 
switch to Option B. Overall, Option A was chosen 5.52 times, hence indicating risk aversion 
in the aggregate data. Looking at the number of safe choices made by husbands and wives 
separately, we do not find a significant difference, meaning that there are no gender 
differences in risk aversion in the aggregate.
7  The large fraction of extremely risk-averse 
husbands (25% chose Option A nine times and only then switched to Option B) and wives 
(17%) might seem unusual at first sight. However, these fractions are in the range of 
extremely risk-averse choices reported in Holt and Laury (2002) for their treatments with 
                                                 
6 Note that the fraction of inconsistent choices ranged from 5% to 13% in Holt and Laury (2002), depending 
upon treatment. Between 9% and 23% of all choices were inconsistent in de Palma et al. (2008). In Bateman and 
Munro (2005), 6% of the participants chose strictly dominated options.  
7 To test the null hypothesis of no gender difference, we matched the number of safe choices of both spouses in a 
household and then applied a Wilcoxon signed ranks test using matched pairs (p-value = 0.14). In their high-
stakes treatment, Holt and Laury (2002) did not find any gender differences either.   11
relatively high stakes. When the high payoff from the safe (risky) option was 100 USD 
(192.50 USD), 15% of all subjects chose the safe option nine times and only shifted to the 
risky option in the final, tenth choice (when there is no longer risk involved). In their 
treatment with very high stakes – with the high payoff in the safe (risky) option yielding 180 
USD (346.50 USD) – Holt and Laury (2002) observed that 40% of their subjects chose the 
safe option nine times. 
The average number of safe choices made by couples is between the corresponding 
figures for husbands and wives. Although the data in Table 3 might seem as if the decisions of 
couples were less extreme than individual decisions (maybe as a consequence of a willingness 
to compromise), Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do not reveal any significant distributional 
differences in terms of number of safe choices between couples and husbands and wives 
respectively. In the aggregate, therefore, the joint decisions of couples and the individual 
decisions of spouses look the same. 
However, the aggregate perspective does not answer our main research questions about 
what makes spouses’ individual decisions similar and which spouse has more influence on a 
couple’s joint decision. We therefore turn to an analysis of data at the household level. In the 
following we consider only households in which all three sets of decisions (those of the 
husband, of the wife, and of the couple) were fully consistent. Recall that twelve husbands 
and nine wives made inconsistent choices in the individual decision making part of Stage 2. 
Out of these, there were three couples where both the husband and the wife made inconsistent 
choices, implying a total of 18 households where at least one spouse made inconsistent 
choices. In addition, three couples made inconsistent choices while at the same time none of 
the spouses involved made any inconsistent decisions individually. Hence, the total sample of 
117 households is reduced by 18 households with individual inconsistencies and three 
households where the joint decisions were inconsistent. This yields a total of 96 households 
with fully consistent choices.   12
4.2  Analysis of data at the household level 
4.2.1  Similarity of spouses in individual decisions 
The husband and the wife made the same number of safe choices in the individual 
decision making part in only six out of 96 households (6%). Hence, we observe substantial 
differences in risk preferences between spouses (contrary to what the unitary model of the 
household would assume). In 49 households (51%), the husband is more risk averse, and in 41 
household (43%) the wife. If we look at the difference in number of safe choices between 
wives and husbands, the mean value is –0.5 (standard deviation 3.64), the maximum 7, and 
the minimum –9. The average absolute difference in number of safe choices between wives 
and husbands is 2.98 (standard deviation 2.13). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
We will now analyze the conditions under which the spouses’ individual decisions are 
more similar. We estimate an OLS model with the absolute difference in number of safe 
choices between the husband and the wife in a given household as the dependent variable.
8 
Table 4 reports the results. 
Household income has a significantly negative effect on the absolute difference in number 
of safe choices; i.e., the higher the household income, the more similar the spouses’ individual 
choices with respect to risk taking. The share of household income contributed by the wife 
has a strong and significant effect as well; an increase in this share by 10 percentage points 
reduces the absolute difference in number of safe choices by 0.34.  
We also find a weakly significant effect of communist party membership. In households 
where both spouses are members of the communist party, the absolute difference in number of 
                                                 
8 The dependent variable is between zero and nine, since the maximum difference in the number of safe choices 
is nine. We also estimated a negative binomial model, which could be more suitable for non-negative integer 
data. In terms of the signs and significance levels of marginal effects, there were very small differences 
compared to the OLS model. The results from the negative binomial model are available upon request.   13
safe choices is reduced by approximately one unit. None of the other variables we considered 
to be potentially important has any significant effect on similarity of risk preferences. Among 
these, it seems particularly noteworthy that length of marriage does not have an effect. In 
addition, there is no significant influence of number of children, absolute difference in age (in 
years), or difference in years of education. 
 
4.2.2  The relative influence of each spouse on a couple’s joint decision 
To analyze which spouse’s risk preferences are better reflected in a couple’s joint decision, 
we distinguish three possible cases: (i) The number of safe choices made by the couple is in 
the range of safe choices made by the husband and the wife individually. (ii) The couple 
makes more safe choices, i.e., is more risk averse, than each of the spouses individually. (iii) 
The couple makes fewer safe choices, i.e., is more risk loving, than the husband and the wife 
individually. If the couple’s decision is closer to the husband’s (wife’s) individual decisions, 
we conclude that the husband (wife) has a stronger influence on the joint decision since the 
other spouse accepted a larger deviation from her (his) individually preferred number of safe 
choices. Table 5 summarizes the three cases introduced above and indicates how the decisions 
of the couple relate to the spouses’ individual decisions. In order to check whether the 
relationship between a couple’s decisions and those of each spouse is different depending on 
how far apart the spouses’ individual decisions are, Table 5 splits the full sample at the 
median absolute difference of number of safe choices (which is 2) and the subsamples are 
presented in Columns [B] and [C]. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
First note from panels [1] and [1’] in Table 5 that 74 out of 96 couples agree on a number 
of safe choices that is in the range of the husband’s and the wife’s number of safe choices. For   14
the remaining 22 couples we observe more extreme decisions (in either direction) than made 
by the spouses individually (see panels [2] and [3]).
9 Within each panel, we classify the joint 
decisions in relation to the spouses’ individual decisions as follows: (a) The number of safe 
choices made by the couple is identical to the husband’s number of safe choices, but different 
from the wife’s; (b) it is closer to the husband’s number of safe decisions; (c) it is of equal 
distance to both spouses; (d) it is closer to the wife’s number of safe choices; or (e) it is 
identical to the wife’s number of safe choices, but different from the husband’s. We use a χ² 
test to examine the null hypothesis that the couple’s joint decision has the same probability of 
belonging in any of the five categories (a) to (e).
10 For panel [1], which covers the large 
majority of cases, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.007). Rather, Table 5 
reveals that the couple’s decision is significantly more often closer to the husband’s decision. 
This raises the question about under what circumstances a couple’s decision is more strongly 
influenced by the wife’s preferences. 
For the econometric analysis, we use three categories of how the number of safe choices 
made by a couple relates to the number of safe choices made by the husband and the wife 
separately: (1) couple is closer to husband, (2) couple is equally distant from husband and 
wife, and (3) couple is closer to wife. We estimate the probability that the decision of the 
couple falls into one of the three categories with an ordered probit model. The marginal 
effects of the ordered probit model are presented in Table 6.
11 For dummy variables, we report 
the discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1. The independent variables are intended to 
capture factors that influence both the absolute and the relative bargaining strength of the 
                                                 
9 A model by Mazzocco (2004) can explain how differences in the spouses’ individual risk attitudes can lead to 
more extreme choices of the household than those made by either of the spouses. Hence, couples that make more 
extreme decisions than either spouse individually can not simply be dismissed as having made a mistake. A 
paper by Eliaz, Raj and Razin (2006) also shows that decisions in groups (like families) can lead to choice shifts 
that yield more extreme outcomes than the decisions of individual group members. 
10 Given the discrete choice set, it is clear that with an odd difference in the number of safe choices between the 
husband and the wife, category (c) is not feasible. When applying the χ² test, we therefore correct for the 
possibility of different probabilities of the five possible categories. 
11 Calculating the predicted probabilities for the three categories at sample means shows that the joint decision is 
closer to the husband’s decision with a predicted probability of 57% but closer to the wife’s decision with a 
predicted probability of only 33%.   15
husband and the wife. With respect to age and education, we include dummy variables 
indicating whether the wife has more years of education (= 1) and whether she is older than 
the husband (= 1), instead of using the differences in years, since for the relative bargaining 
strength, the fact of being better educated or older (and hence more experienced) might carry 
more weight than the size of the difference.
12 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Both the total household income and the relative female contribution to the household 
income have a significant effect on the outcome of the couple’s decision. If the wife 
contributes relatively more to the household income, or if the household is richer, then the 
couple’s number of safe choices is more likely to reflect the wife’s risk preferences. Recall 
that these same two variables have been found to make husbands and wives more similar with 
respect to their individual choices. The estimations in Table 6 show that household income 
and relative income contribution of the wife have, in fact, two effects: one on individual 
similarity in risk attitudes, and one on the wife’s influence on a couple’s joint decision. 
Education and party membership are two other factors that give more power to women. If 
a wife has more years of schooling than her husband, the couple’s decision becomes less 
likely to be closer to the husband’s preferences, although the effect is only weakly significant. 
Taking all other variables at sample mean, the predicted probability of the joint decision being 
closer to the wife’s decision is 44% if the wife is better educated than the husband, but only 
27% if not. This shows that education is an important factor for household decision making. If 
the wife is a member of the communist party, she has a significantly stronger influence on the 
couple’s decision (increasing ceteris paribus the likelihood of the joint decision being closer 
to the wife’s decision from 26% without party membership to 70% with party membership). 
                                                 
12 In fact, using the differences in years of education and age instead of the dummies “Wife better educated” or 
“Wife older” yields practically the same results.   16
A similar effect is not found for men, as their party membership does not shift the couple’s 
decision significantly in their favored direction. Although we want to refrain from speculating 
why party membership is associated with a stronger influence of women in the household, it 
is interesting that communist party membership affects both the similarity of the spouses’ 
individual decisions (when both are party members) and the closeness of the joint decision to 
the wife’s individual decision. 
The ordered probit has also controlled for other possibly important factors, such as the 
wife being older, number of children, length of the marriage, and difference in number of safe 
choices between wives and husbands. However, none of these has a significant influence on 
whether a couple’s joint decision is closer to the husband’s or the wife’s number of safe 
choices. Motivated by the insights from Ashraf (forthcoming) – whose study shows that the 
allocation of control over household savings has a strong influence on spouses’ joint financial 
decisions – we included some questions on who makes decisions in three different types of 
situations in a post-experimental questionnaire. Table 7 reports the three questions and the 
answers of the 96 couples. The responses to Question 1 make clear that women are ascribed a 
stronger influence on daily decisions, while men are indicated to have more influence in small 
investment decisions (Question 2). Concerning big investment decisions (Question 3), a large 
majority of couples report making joint decisions. The distribution of answers is significantly 
different across the three questions (χ²-test, p-value = 0.000). However, including the answers 
to these questions in the ordered probit regression reported in Table 6 shows that none of 
them has a significant impact on how the couple’s joint decision relates to the husband’s or 
wife’s number of safe choices. 
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5  Conclusion 
This paper has presented an artefactual field experiment through which we have studied 
the decision making of couples in a rural area of China. A novel feature of this experiment on 
the economics of household decision making is the fact that the 117 participating couples 
were randomly sampled from the region of Majiang in the southwest province of Guizhou. 
The average earnings from the experiment equaled almost 1% of the average yearly 
participant income, making it a high-stakes experiment on decision making under risk. We 
were particularly interested in examining (i) the conditions under which the individual 
decisions of spouses are similar and (ii) the main factors that yield more influence to the wife 
when couples have to make joint decisions. 
We found that spouses have more similar individual risk preferences the richer the 
household, the larger the income share contributed by the wife, or when both spouses are 
members of the communist party. However, these findings should not cover up the fact that 
the spouses’ individual risk preferences were identical in only 6% of the households. Hence, 
there is a large degree of heterogeneity within households, which shows that the assumptions 
of the unitary model of household decision making are, in general, too restrictive. Although 
the latter has been shown with the use of empirical data before (see, e.g., Thomas, 1994; 
Duflo, 2003), we are not aware of any controlled experiment that has studied the level of 
similarity of spouses’ individual decisions. 
We also found that a couple’s joint decision is typically closer to the individual 
preferences of the husband, which is similar to what is reported in de Palma et al. (2008). 
However, we were also able to identify crucial conditions that shift a couple’s joint decision 
in the direction of the wife’s individual preferences. An increase in the overall household 
income or in the relative share of household income contributed by the wife increases the 
likelihood that a couple’s decision is closer to the wife’s risk preferences than to the 
husband’s. Furthermore, if the wife has more years of education than her husband, or if she is   18
a member of the communist party, then the husband has less influence on the couple’s joint 
decision. These findings provide controlled evidence of the conditions that favor the wife in 
the intra-household decision-making process. Note that we did not set up a structured 
bargaining procedure in our experiment (which could have been necessary had we wanted to 
test a particular collectivist model of household decision making; see Vermeulen, 2002) since 
that could have been perceived as artificial by the participants. Rather, we asked couples to 
discuss the experimental task and come up with a joint decision on each lottery choice. This 
seems to be a natural environment for making decisions in a household. Contrary to earlier 
experiments on the decision making of couples (e.g., Bateman and Munro, 2005; de Palma et 
al., 2008; Ashraf, forthcoming), our experiment was run in the homes of the participating 
couples rather than in an external place like a bank or town hall in order to observe household 
decision making where it usually takes place, namely at home. By using very high stakes, we 
wanted to make the decisions very salient, such that it is in the best interest of any participant 
to make a decision that fits his or her preferences best. 
It seems important to stress that our experimental approach should be considered to be 
complementary to non-experimental studies of household decision making. One advantage of 
running an experiment such as ours is the opportunity to observe the individual preferences of 
both spouses as well as the joint decision of the couple. Such a comparison of individual and 
joint decisions would be much more complicated with non-experimental field data since it 
would be very demanding to keep the conditions for decision making constant in both 
instances, i.e., when making decisions individually and when making them jointly with one’s 
spouse. 
In sum, our experiment identified several important factors that contribute to an increase 
in the decision-making power of wives. Historically, Chinese women have had very little say 
in household decisions, in particular in rural areas. They have also been discriminated against 
when it comes to access to education. For example, educating sons has been seen as an   19
investment in old-age support since it has been regarded as more likely that sons will get paid 
work, therefore leaving women to work on the farmland (Hannum, 2005). Our results suggest 
that policy measures to improve the education and the labor force participation of women are 
key factors in increasing the power of women in households and ultimately putting them on 
equal footing with men. The rapid economic growth in China in recent decades has had 
double-edged effects on female education and work conditions, though: While female school 
enrollment has increased (Hannum, 2005), so has the gender-wage gap, although from a low 
initial level (Gustafsson and Li, 2000). According to our findings, the former effect increases 
the influence of women on household decisions, while the latter effect – through a ceteris 
paribus decrease in the share of household income contributed by women – decreases the 
influence of women. The findings of Qian (2008), i.e., that an increase in female income 
affects the survival rate of girls and improves the school attainment of children, indicate that 
not only the current generation of women, but also the future generation of their children will 
benefit from an increased power of women in the household. Our results suggest that the 
factors leading to more power are better education and higher relative income contribution. In 
addition, communist party membership was found to empower women. Whether this is an 
artifact of our data or an intended – and successful – aim of the communist party is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (N = 117 households) 
Variable Description  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Max 
Income per capita 
Household yearly income in Chinese Yuan per 
capita 
3,919 8,200  200 84,117 
Log Equivalence scaled 
income 
Log of equivalence scaled household income in 
Chinese Yuan. Equivalence scale = (Adults + 0.5 x 
Kids)^0.75 
8.058 1.024  5.645  11.751 
Wife income 
contribution 
Wife’s share of total household income  0.418  0.152  0  1 
Length of marriage   Number of years the couple has been married  26.465  12.458  1  52 
Number of children  Number of children the couple has  1.077  1.043  0  6 
Wife more educated  = 1 if wife has a higher education than the husband  0.145  0.354  0  1 
Education difference 
between spouses 
Education difference between spouses in absolute 
value 
3.235 2.513  0  10 
Wife older  = 1 if wife is older than husband  0.291  0.456  0  1 
Age difference  Age difference between spouses 
between spouses  in absolute value 
2.863 3.109  0  19 
Wife, party member  = 1 if wife is party/cadre member  0.077  0.268  0  1 
Husband, party member  =1 if husband is party/cadre member  0.179  0.385  0  1 
Both spouses party 
members 
= 1 if both spouses are party/cadre members  0.043  0.203  0  1 
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Table 2. The ten paired lottery-choice decisions in amounts of Chinese Yuan (¥). 
Decision Option  A  Option  B 
Difference in expected 
payoff (Option A-
Option B) 
[1]  1/10 of ¥20,   9/10 of ¥16  1/10 of ¥38.5,   9/10 of ¥1  ¥ 11.7 
[2]  2/10 of ¥20,   8/10 of ¥16  2/10 of ¥38.5,   8/10 of ¥1  ¥  8.3 
[3]  3/10 of ¥20,   7/10 of ¥16  3/10 of ¥38.5,   7/10 of ¥1  ¥ 5.0 
[4]  4/10 of ¥20,   6/10 of ¥16  4/10 of ¥38.5,   6/10 of ¥1  ¥ 1.6 
[5]  5/10 of ¥20,   5/10 of ¥16  5/10 of ¥38.5,   5/10 of ¥1  -¥ 1.8 
[6]  6/10 of ¥20,   4/10 of ¥16  6/10 of ¥38.5,   4/10 of ¥1  -¥ 5.1 
[7]  7/10 of ¥20,   3/10 of ¥16  7/10 of ¥38.5,   3/10 of ¥1  -¥ 8.5 
[8]  8/10 of ¥20,   2/10 of ¥16  8/10 of ¥38.5,   2/10 of ¥1  -¥ 11.8 
[9]  9/10 of ¥20,   1/10 of ¥16  9/10 of ¥38.5,   1/10 of ¥1  -¥ 15.2 
[10]  10/10 of ¥20,  0/10 of ¥16  10/10 of ¥38.5,  0/10 of ¥1  -¥ 18.5 
“p/10 of ¥x,   q/10 of ¥y” reads that the amount x is gained with probability p/10 and the amount y with the probability 
q/10 (= 1 – p/10). 
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Table 3. Risk-aversion classification based on lottery choices 
Proportion of choices   
Number of  
Safe choices 
Husbands 
(N = 105) 
Wives 
(N = 108) 
Couples 
(N = 105) 
0-1 0.02  0.09  0.05 
2 0.06  0.05  0.03 
3 0.10  0.09  0.04 
4 0.16  0.10  0.12 
5 0.10  0.19  0.26 
6 0.16  0.14  0.17 
7 0.09  0.09  0.11 
8 0.06  0.08  0.09 
9 0.25  0.17  0.13 
Average number of 
safe choices  5.79 5.19  5.59 
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Table 4. OLS regression on the similarity of risk attitudes (p-values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient   
Log equivalence scaled income 
 
-0.728 
(0.000) 
*** 
Wife’s relative contribution to household income 
 
-3.387 
(0.024) 
** 
Length of marriage in years 
 
0.005 
(0.828) 
 
Number of children 
 
-0.003 
(0.989) 
 
Age difference between husband and wife 
 
-0.023 
(0.775) 
 
Difference in years of education 
 
-0.013 
(0.871) 
 
Both spouses party members ( = 1) 
 
-1.038 
(0.099) 
* 
Constant 6.958 
(0.000) 
 
R-square 0.14   
Number of observations  96   
Dependent variable: Absolute difference in number of safe choices of husband and wife. 
Robust standard errors are estimated. 
*** (**) [*] significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level.   27
Table 5. Relation between couples’ decisions and those of the husbands and wives 
individually 
Relation between decisions  
[A] 
Total 
 
[B] 
Difference in number of 
safe choices of spouses ≤ 2 
[C] 
Difference in number of 
safe choices of spouses > 2 
[1] Safe choices of couple in the range of the husband and the wife (with husband different from wife) 
(a) Couple same as husband  24 (34%)*  13 (52%)  11 (24%) 
(b) Couple closer to husband  16 (23%)    16 (35%) 
(c) Couple equally distant to 
husband and wife 
7 (10%)  4 (16%)  3 (7%) 
(d) Couple closer to wife  11 (15%)    11 (24%) 
(e) Couple same as wife  13 (18%)  8 (32%)  5 (11%) 
Total  71 (100%)  25 (100%)  46 (100%) 
[1’] Risk preference of couple is identical to husband’s and wife’s 
Couple equal to both  3 (100%)  -  - 
[2] Couple makes more safe choices than either spouse 
(a-b) Couple closer to 
husband 
6 (86%)  4 (80%)  2 (100%) 
(c) Couple equally distant to 
husband and wife 
0 (0%)  0 (0%)  0 (0%) 
(d-e) Couple closer to wife  1 (14%)  1 (20%)  0 (0%) 
Total  7 (100%)  5 (100%)  2 (100%) 
[3] Couple makes fewer safe choices than either spouse 
(a-b) Couple closer to 
husband 
7 (47%)  6 (55%)  1 (25%) 
(c) Couple equally distant to 
husband and wife 
3 (20%)  3 (27%)  0 (0%) 
(d-e) Couple closer to wife  5 (33%)  2 (18%)  3 (75%) 
Total  15 (100%)  11 (100%)   4 (100%) 
* Percentages in parentheses are in relation to the absolute number of cases within each panel.   28
Table 6. Marginal effects from an ordered probit model (p-values in parentheses) 
Dependent variable 
(i) Couple closer to 
husband 
(ii) Equal 
distance 
(iii) Couple closer to  
wife 
Variable Marginal    Marginal  Marginal   
Log equivalence scaled income 
 
-0.143 
(0.009) 
*** 0.019 
(0.107) 
0.124 
(0.009) 
*** 
Wife’s relative income contribution 
 
-0.812 
(0.031) 
** 0.108 
(0.144) 
0.704 
(0.029) 
** 
Length of marriage in years 
 
0.006 
(0.307) 
 -0.002 
(0.374) 
-0.005 
(0.304) 
 
Number of children 
 
-0.013 
(0.787) 
 0.002 
(0.788) 
0.011 
(0.787) 
 
Wife better educated (= 1) 
 
-0.189 
(0.093) 
* 0.013 
(0.192) 
0.175 
(0.112) 
 
Wife older (= 1) 
 
0.075 
(0.518) 
 -0.011 
(0.563) 
-0.064 
(0.512) 
 
Wife is party member (= 1) 
 
-0.420 
(0.004) 
*** -0.023 
(0.637) 
0.443 
(0.019) 
** 
Husband is party member (= 1) 
 
0.093 
(0.543) 
 -0.015 
(0.624) 
-0.078 
(0.527) 
 
Difference in safe choices (wife – 
husband) 
-0.014 
(0.378) 
 0.002 
(0.417) 
0.012 
(0.378) 
 
Threshold parameter 1 (standard error) 
 
2.005 
(0.708) 
 
  
 
Threshold parameter 2 (standard error) 
 
2.417 
(0.719) 
 
  
 
Pseudo R2  0.103         
Number of observations  96         
Robust standard errors are estimated. 
*** (**) [*] significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level.   29
Table 7. Questionnaire responses 
Question  … it is mainly the 
wife who decides 
… we decide 
jointly 
… it is mainly the 
husband who decides 
A) When it comes to daily decisions about 
what to do with the money in your household, 
for example buying food and clothes, would 
you say that … 
38 
(40 %) 
46 
(48 %) 
12 
(12 %) 
B) When it comes to small investment 
decisions, for example buying equipment for 
the house, would you say that … 
20 
(21 %) 
34 
(35 %) 
42 
(44 %) 
C) When it comes to big investment decisions 
or using a large amount of money to purchase 
some goods, for example furniture or a TV, 
would you say that … 
10 
(10 %) 
61 
(64 %) 
25 
(26 %) 
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Appendix: Oral presentation of the risk experiment to participants (script for 
experimenters – not intended for publication) 
 
We will now ask you to make 10 choices between alternatives. In each alternative there is a 
chance that you will earn a certain amount of money. How much you earn depends on things 
you cannot affect. In the end, you will draw a card randomly to decide which question will be 
used. This means that you will answer 10 questions, but only one question will determine 
your income. Right now, we do not know which one will be used.  
 
Now let me explain to you how it works. Let us look at the chips and price tag on the table, 
and at the first choice situation. On the table, on this side, we have 1 white chip and 9 black 
chips with 2 price tags reading 20 and 16. On that side, we have 1 white chip and 9 black 
chips as well, but with 2 price tags reading 38.5 and 1. White chips stand for higher income 
on both sides and black chips stand for lower income on both sides. Therefore, on this side, if 
you draw a white chip you will get 20 (Yuan), and if you draw a black chip, you will get 16 
(Yuan). On the other side, if you draw a white chip you will get 38.5 (Yuan) and if you draw a 
black chip you will get 1 (Yuan). Now let us look at numbers – we have 1 white chip and 9 
black chips. This means that on this side there is a 90% chance you will get 16 (Yuan) and a 
10% chance you will get 20 (Yuan). On the other side, you will have a 90% chance to get 1 
(Yuan) and a 10% chance to get 38.5 (Yuan). Which side do you prefer? 
 
Let us now look at the second choice situation. On the table, on this side, there are 2 white 
chips and 8 black chips with 2 price tags reading 20 and 16. On that side, there are 2 white 
chips and 8 black chips as well, with 2 price tags reading 38.5 and 1. As you know, white 
chips stand for higher income on both sides and black chips stand for lower income on both 
sides. Therefore, on this side, if you draw a white chip you will get 20 (Yuan), and if you   31
draw a black chip you will get 16 (Yuan). On the other side, if you draw a white chip you will 
get 38.5 (Yuan), and if you draw a black chip you will get 1 (Yuan). Now let us look at 
numbers. There are 2 white chips and 8 black chips. This means that on this side there is an 
80% chance that you will get 16 (Yuan) and a 20% chance that you will get 20 (Yuan). On the 
other side, you will have an 80% chance of getting 1 (Yuan) and a 20% chance of getting 38.5 
(Yuan). Which side do you prefer?  
 
At the end of the survey, when you have answered all the questions, you will draw a card to 
decide which question will be used, and then draw a chip to decide how much you will earn. 
Let me remind you again, you will make ten decisions, but at the end, only one of these will 
end up affecting your earnings. You will not know in advance which decision will be used. 
Each decision has an equal chance of being chosen. 
 
Let us practice before we start. Suppose a random draw of one card from ten cards determines 
the first decision to be played for real. Hence, we will use the first decision as an example. 
Assume that you have chosen this side (with high payoff of 38.5 Yuan). In order to determine 
how much you will be paid, you need to draw a chip (let the subject draw a chip). How much 
money do you make? Assume that you have chosen that side (with high payoff of 20 Yuan). 
In order to determine how much you will be paid, you need to draw a chip (let the subject 
draw a chip). How much money do you make?     
 
Do you have any questions or should we proceed with the ten decisions? 
 
 